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Abstract 
“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”, generally 
regarded as the guiding principle of African humanism, expresses the 
view that a person is a person through other persons and is closely 
associated but not identical with African communitarianism, or 
communalism. Against Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “unrestricted or radical or 
excessive communitarianism” Kwame Gyekye has proposed a 
“restricted or moderate communitarianism”. Whereas personhood, for 
Menkiti, is acquired over time, with increasing moral maturation, 
seniority and agency, Gyekye considers it to arise automatically with 
being born human. The problem with Menkiti’s account of personhood 
is that it is at once too wide and too narrow. On the other hand, it 
remains unclear to what extent Gyekye’s is a communitarian view – and 
to what extent it is distinctly ‘African’. I conclude with a critical 
reflection on the implications of African communalism and personhood 
for non-human animals. 
Keywords: Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, African 
Communitarianism, Non-Human Animals, Personhood. 
A man who calls his kinsmen to a feast does not do so to save 
them from starving. They all have food in their own homes. 
When we gather together in the moonlit village ground it is not 
because of the moon. Every man can see it in his own 
compound. We come together because it is good for the kinsmen 
to do so ... I fear for you young people because you do not 
understand how strong is the bond of kinship. You do not know 
what it is to speak with one voice. (ACHEBE 1996, 118) 
A live sheep was presented to us according to custom. After we 
clapped our hands in gratitude, the sheep was taken away for 
slaughter. (MUROVE 2008, 85) 
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Different kinds of Communitarianism, the Community, and the 
Individual 
“In traditional life,” according to the classic formulation by John Samuel 
Mbiti (1989, 106; see also MENKITI 1984, 171, 179; GBADEGESIN 
1998b, 295; KAPHAGAWANI 2004, 337; MANGENA 2012, 11), 
the individual does not and cannot exist alone except 
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including 
those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply 
part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create, 
or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the 
corporate group ... Only in terms of other people does the 
individual become conscious of his own being, his own duties, 
his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards 
other people. When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but with 
the corporate group; when he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but 
with his kinsmen, his neighbours and relatives, whether dead or 
living … Whatever happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens 
to the individual. The individual can only say: “I am because we 
are, and since we are, therefore I am”. This is the cardinal point 
in the understanding of the African view of man.  
Unlike in the Western sense of community, the sense of ‘we’ in this case 
is not additive or aggregative but “a thoroughly fused collective ‘we’” 
(MENKITI 1984, 179). “I am because we are, and since we are, 
therefore I am”, generally regarded as the guiding principle of African 
humanism, is also at the heart of ubuntu, a Nguni language group term 
for common or shared human personhood. (Equivalent concepts are 
botho or hunhu.) It expresses the view that a person is a person through 
other persons – umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – and is closely associated 
but not identical with African communalism. Mbiti’s assertions that the 
community makes, creates or produces the individual and that “the 
individual depends on the corporate group” indicate advocacy of a 
communalist view of personhood, in which the status of an individual is 
determined by social and cultural criteria. As Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 
172) puts it, “in the African view [of human beings] it is the community 
which defines the person as person, not some static quality like 
rationality, will, or memory”, and “human community plays a crucial 
role in the individual’s acquisition of full personhood” (1984, 179). 
In a related vein, “Harmony, friendliness, community are great 
goods”, as Desmond Tutu (1999, 35) enthuses in his personal account of 
the Truth and Reconciliation process in post-apartheid South Africa:  
Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest 
good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after 
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good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust 
for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, 
are corrosive to this good. (Ibid.) 
After noting, with Lesiba Joe Teffo, that, “African societies placed a 
high value on human worth, but it was a humanism that found 
expression in a communal context rather than the individualism that 
often characterises the West” (VENTER 2004, 151; TEFFO 1998, 3), 
Elza Venter asserts that in “African culture the community always 
comes first” (2004, 151; emphasis added). Teffo states, similarly, that 
according to 
the African conception of man […, an] African person is an 
integral part of society and thus, as an individual, can only exist 
corporately … [and] is inseparable from the community … 
However, it should be emphasised that individuality is not 
negated in the African conception of humankind. What is 
discouraged is the view that the individual should take 
precedence over the community. (1996, 103; emphasis added)  
Communalism has been claimed to be one of the most distinctive 
features of African philosophizing (and especially African ethics) – a 
communitarian outlook not textually preserved but expressed rather 
through various forms of narrative: songs, proverbs, folk tales, fables 
and legends. Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi (2011, 111) claims that 
“morality in Africa is grounded in a form of communitarianism” and 
that from communitarianism flow key African values: cooperation, 
consensus, reconciliation, and commonality. African communitarianism, 
communalism, or ‘narrativism’, is held not to imply an insular approach 
to identity and culture, but rather to accommodate the fact of the 
dynamism of the sources of identity and culture (ODUOR 2012; see also 
WIREDU 2008). It is a theory of shared identity and goodwill (see 
UGWUANYI 2011, 111). Kwasi Wiredu (2008) has referred to African 
communalism as the foundation for national reconstruction. Traditional 
African society, he claims, was communalist, founded on kinship 
relations and a system of reciprocity. (Here the question arises whether 
this is not true of all small-scale societies or communities. If so, one 
would have to look elsewhere for any unique or distinctive features of 
African communitarian philosophy.) Morality is the adjustment of one’s 
interests to the community under a common guiding principle, like the 
Golden Rule. On this model, communalism might be characterised as 
the adjustment of the individual’s interests to those of the community. 
After quoting Kwame Nkrumah – that African communalism is a form 
of socialism – Wiredu (2008) contends that Western communitarianism 
took root in individualist systems. Western communitarianism, for him, 
is compatible with certain forms of cultural individualism, which 
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African communitarianism is not. Masolo argues, similarly, that because 
“Western communitarianism … arises in the context of a perceived 
incongruency between the values of liberalism, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the reality of the deprivation of groups, which is viewed as 
contrary to the very values articulated by liberalism, it stands more as a 
watchdog for the common good than as a robust social theory”. This is 
unlike African communitarianism, which characterizes traditional social 
and political orders (2004, 488). Wiredu suggests that the term 
‘communalism’ therefore be reserved for the latter, but not the former. 
Communalism, he claims, is the basis for a good and just society.  
Apart from raising the question whether this move does not 
define communalism into morality, rather than see it as one amongst 
several orientations in ethics, Wiredu’s account appears to equate 
individualism with egoism or selfishness (see also WIREDU 1998, 311; 
MENKITI 1979, 179; GBADEGESIN 1998a, 168, and MASOLO 2004, 
496). This is a common confusion that is rather disturbing, not least 
because “selfish acts are likened to the practices of a witch”, as Dismas 
Masolo has pointed out (2010: 252). This explains why, to this day, 
people’s individualism or idiosyncratic behaviour is frequently 
interpreted not only as selfishness but also as being related to witchcraft, 
interpreted here as negative or undesirable. However, without even 
considering the dubious ‘rationality’ informing witchcraft beliefs and 
witchcraft accusations, the relation between individualism and egoism is 
at best contingent. Rights-based theories are good examples of 
individualist orientations that are not essentially or necessarily self-
regarding. Far from being characterized by “austerely delimited social 
sympathies” they often, like the communalism favoured by Wiredu, 
exhibit a “pervasive commitment to social involvement” (1998, 311). 
After all, it is recognition of individual rights that makes social living 
and flourishing possible. A significant distinguishing characteristic is 
that individual rights should not be violated or infringed in the pursuit of 
the social or communal good. Sympathy and empathy, both singled out 
by Wiredu as the “very foundation of morality” (see MASOLO 2004, 
496), concern individuals – and not collectives or communal entities. To 
sum up this point, an individualistic orientation need not be ‘selfish’ or 
‘egoistic’ but is perfectly compatible with sympathy and empathy, a 
concern with other individuals as individuals. In fact, it is what arguably 
makes sympathy and empathy possible in the first place. 
One could ask, furthermore, whether Africa’s predicament (see 
KABOU 1991) might not in part be the result of the preoccupation on 
the African continent with communalism – which underlies (usually 
unquestioning) obedience to authority, traditional leaders, ancestors, 
spirits etc. – and arguably also of the ‘tyranny of consensus’. The idea 
here is that ‘palaver democracy’, which aims at agreement, is 
considerably less democratic than a system – educational or political – 
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that encourages dissent and critical interrogation. (See also 
Kochalumchuvattil 2010, 111: “consensus in both the social and 
political spheres can all too often be sidetracked into an oppressive from 
of collectivism or communalism”.) A stark example of unquestioning 
obedience is provided in Segun Gbadegesin’s account of Yoruba leader 
Móremí, who obeyed the “river spirit’s” purported demand to sacrifice 
her only son for the sake of the community (1998b, 294). This may be 
an illustration of the traditional Yoruba values of “fellow-feeling, 
solidarity, and selflessness” (294-295), but it equally exemplifies 
superstition and credulous acceptance of putative demands for securing 
the collective benefit. 
Personhood 
Wiredu distinguishes between descriptive (ontological-metaphysical) 
and normative (social-moral) conceptions of personhood (1992; 1998, 
309-313; see also MASOLO 2010 and OYOWE 2014). The Akan 
descriptive conception includes: okra (life force; the life principle and 
source of human dignity and destiny); sunsum (main bearer of one’s 
personality; the personality or charisma principle); nipadua (body) 
derived from mogya (the blood or kinship principle). Whether or not 
okra can be translated as ‘soul’ has been a matter of disagreement 
between Gyekye (who thinks it can) and Wiredu (who rejects this 
possibility). These two philosophers also disagree about sunsum: here, 
too, Wiredu adopts a more materialist interpretation of the Akan 
worldview. For anyone who is not Akan, it is impossible to adjudicate 
who is correct in his factual interpretation (see KAPHAGAWANI 2004, 
332-333).  
The Yoruba, too, have a tripartite conception of the person 
(ènìyàn) (see GBADEGESIN 1998a, 149; KAPHAGAWANI 2004, 
333-334): ara (body), èmí (the life-giving element or vital principle), 
and orì (destiny; determinant of personality). This is similar to the Ibo 
aru (physical body), chi (destiny), and inmuo (immortal spirit, which 
ensures the individual’s self-identity over time) (see GBADEGESIN 
1998a, 149; IMAFIDON N.D, 4-6). The normative conception, on the 
other hand, reveals a person’s social status and involves a judgement of 
her moral standing. As Imafidon posits, “Normatively, personhood is 
not something one is born with … a person is not just any human being, 
but one who has attained the status of a responsible member of the 
society” (IMAFIDON N.D, 7). “Normatively speaking, one cannot be a 
person without a community” (IMAFIDON N.D, 9). In other words, the 
normative conception, which is generally considered to be fundamental 
in African thought, involves the assertion that any compelling definition 
of personhood must refer to “the environing community” (MENKITI 
1984, 171). In African thought, according to Menkiti, personhood is 
attained by undergoing “rites of incorporation, including those of 
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initiation during puberty time”. This accounts for the emphasis on 
“rituals of incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the 
social rules by which the community lives, so that what was initially 
biologically given can come to attain self-hood, i.e. become a person” 
(1984, 173-174). In other words, in order to attain personhood in the 
normative sense, one must belong to a cultural community: “without 
incorporation into this or that community, individuals are considered to 
be mere danglers to whom the description ‘person’ does not fully apply” 
(1984, 172). 
For Menkiti, then, personhood is not something that arises 
automatically with being born human. Nor is being the object or being at 
the receiving end of human relational interactions sufficient for 
personhood. It is acquired over time, with increasing moral maturation, 
seniority and agency. For Masolo (2010, 142), it is by means of 
“communicative interaction [that] we become more than just human 
beings: we become persons”. In distinguishing between individuals and 
individual persons (2004, 325), Menkiti refers to the ontological 
movement from an it via personhood back to an it: from conception and 
early childhood (1984, 173-174; 2004, 326, 330), to being a person and 
finally to being one of the nameless dead (2004: 327, 328, 330). Menkiti 
is quite unapologetic about the exclusion on the basis of a (relative) lack 
of moral personality (and even status) of those in the early stages of 
“ontological progression” (1984, 173), i.e. infants and young children. 
For one thing, he notes a “natural tendency in many languages … of 
referring to children and new-borns as it” (ibid.). At least “we have the 
choice of an it for referring to children and new-borns, whereas we have 
no such choice in referring to older persons” (1984, 174). However, this 
is  
 
not just a distinction in language but a distinction laden with 
ontological significance. In the particular context of Africa, 
anthropologists have long noted the relative absence of 
ritualized grief when the death of a young child occurs, whereas 
with the death of older persons, the burial becomes more 
elaborate and the grief more ritualized – indicating a significant 
difference in the conferral of ontological status. (Ibid.) 
 
To be frank, I am unaware of any tendency of referring to neonates and 
young children in gender-neutral terms. I would also think that the death 
of a young child is tragic in a way that the death of an elder is not. After 
all, the older person has lived a long and more or less rich life, 
something a young child has been (tragically) deprived of. A problem is 
also constituted by those more or less permanently deprived of moral 
personality, i.e. those who cannot and will never be able to participate in 
communal life, to contribute to the good – to reciprocate, as it were. 
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Interestingly, Menkiti includes in his account of persons the ancestors, 
the living (and remembered) dead (ibid.) but fails to specify the precise 
grounds for doing so. Is it because they once served a moral function, 
were once moral authorities, and are now remembered and respected for 
this? A similar case for inclusion could then conceivably be made for 
those suffering from senile dementia or who have been rendered 
cognitively disabled through illness or accident. (In none of these cases, 
however, can one meaningfully speak of the “heart grow[ing] 
increasingly wiser”; 2004, 325.) But what about those who were never 
and could never be moral agents in the requisite sense (ranging from 
people with severe autism, to people born with Down syndrome), or 
those with relevant physical disabilities that render them unable to serve 
as moral exemplars, who are unable even to care even for themselves? If 
justice is strictly a matter of reciprocity or reciprocal obligations (1984, 
178; 2004, 328, 330), then what about those who are mentally or 
physically unable to reciprocate, to be in reciprocal relations with other, 
‘normal’ adult human beings? I return to this point in the last section of 
this work. 
Menkiti rightly rejects the ideas of heaven and hell (2004, 327), 
of eternal salvation and damnation as parameters of moral reward and 
punishment, but his ontological-normative framework offers no 
improvement. Quite apart from the odious moral implications, it is every 
bit as problematic as the set of beliefs he rejects. What “moral 
functions” do or could ancestors, the “living dead”, possibly exercise? 
In what way could they be considered “human agents”: are they still 
human – or agents, for that matter? 
Kwame Gyekye, like Menkiti, embraces a broadly 
communitarian or communalist (Gyekye uses these two words 
interchangeably; 1998, 317) conception of ethics and persons. Yet, 
whereas Menkiti endorses the “African understanding” that gives 
priority to the “duties which individuals owe to the collectivity” over 
their rights (1984, 180), Gyekeye – while acknowledging that the 
“communitarian theory will most likely give priority to duties rather 
than rights” (1998, 331) – expresses concern over views that do not 
allow sufficient “room for the exercise of individual rights” (1998, 319). 
He takes issue with the metaphysical status and normative power 
Menkiti ascribes to the community vis-à-vis that of the person, which 
obscures our understanding of what it is like to be a person. In this 
regard, Gyekye questions Menkiti’s reference to the English word ‘it’ as 
indicative of the absence of personhood. He also points out that in many 
African languages it is not customary to use the neuter pronoun in the 
case of babies and young children and that, contrary to what Menkiti 
asserts, “no distinctions as to personhood can be made on the basis of 
the nature and extent of ritualized grief over the death of a child or of an 
older person” (1998, 323). Gyekye maintains that a “human person is a 
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person whatever his/her age or social status” (ibid.), that one “is a 
person because of who one is, not because of what one has acquired” 
(1998, 324). He acknowledges that this coincides with the Western 
conception of personhood. He considers not personhood but moral 
agency to be ‘processual’: this is why infants and children can be 
considered persons but not (yet) moral agents – unlike animals. 
Although “the community can be said to play some role in a person’s 
moral life” (1998, 324), Gyekye seems to be assuming an innatist stance 
not only with regard to personhood but also as far as the development of 
moral qualities is concerned. All persons are potentially morally 
capable. If a person fails to exercise her moral sense or to make and act 
on her moral judgements, if she fails to face up to her responsibilities, 
then this does not mean that she has failed at personhood. She has failed 
in terms of social status and legitimate communal expectations. Her 
failure is as a moral agent. The human person is by nature social or 
communitarian, but she is also rational, capable of evaluating and acting 
on moral judgements, and therefore has a capacity of both virtue and 
choice. The social or cultural community does not create these 
characteristics and traits, but it does bring these to the fore and prize 
them. Communal norms and values are not fixed or set in stone, and it is 
often bold, self-confident, visionary and autonomous individuals who 
lead the process of revision and transformation of these norms and 
values.1 So, Gyekye concludes, Menkiti is not wholly correct in 
claiming that it is the communal structure, community membership or 
social relationships that fully define or confer personhood. 
Against Menkiti’s “unrestricted or radical or excessive 
communitarianism” Gyekye proposes a “restricted or moderate 
communitarianism” (1998, 328). He maintains that his favoured theory 
accommodates not only moral rights but also respect for human dignity 
and the intrinsic worth of a person (see also BUJO 2003, 118-122). He 
provides no compelling argument in this regard, and he does not 
consider well-known problems of conflict between individual rights and 
the common good (or the “communal structure”), or how such conflicts 
might be resolved. He simply asserts that “the absorbing interest in the 
common good … does not – indeed should not – result in the subversion 
of individual rights” (GYEKYE 1998: 330). Gyekye’s only proviso is 
that his communitarian theory would not consider rights to be absolute – 
which is hardly a ground-breaking communitarian stipulation. Rights are 
often in conflict with one another, and there are cases where it is 
impossible to respect one right without violating another. In fact, the 
                                                          
1
 Oritsegbubemi Oyowe contributes an interesting perspective by stating that a society or 
culture may judge a person a failure because of its own narrow-mindedness or bias. He 
suggests that “a more promising conception of personhood should be more liberal in what 
constitutes the good life – i.e., that it permits alternative ways of flourishing in a community” 
or, indeed, flourishing in alternative communities; (2014, 50). 
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United Nations Declaration of Human Rights has established only one 
right as unconditional: the right not to be tortured. Gyekye’s assertions 
that as members of a communal society, individuals “would not have a 
penchant for, or an obsession with, insisting on their rights”, and that 
‘insistence on (some) rights may not be necessary’ (1998, 330, 331), 
have a rather pallid, ad hoc flavour. 
Notwithstanding his references to the “individualistic 
system[’s] … obsession with individual rights” (1998, 331), it remains 
unclear to what extent Gyekye’s view is a communitarian– and to what 
extent it is distinctly ‘African’. The quick answer would be that it is “the 
relational character of the person in the wake of his/her natural 
sociality”, his/her “natural relationality” (1998, 332) that grounds 
his/her duties to others. Yet, on closer inspection it appears that the 
“social and ethical values of social well-being – solidarity, 
interdependence, cooperation, compassion, and reciprocity – which can 
be said to characterize the communitarian morality” (ibid.) impose on 
the individual duties that are not so much duties to the community as 
they are duties to its individual members, on the basis of their human 
dignity, “the intrinsic value of the person” (1998, 333). This would be in 
keeping not only with a duty-based individualism but also with Teffo’s 
Kantian assertion (which, incidentally, hardly squares with his earlier 
claim that the African conception of humankind discourages “the view 
that the individual should take precedence over the community”; see 
1996, 4): 
You and I are members of one and the same race, namely, the 
human race. The essence of man lies in the recognition of man 
as man, before financial, political, and social factors are taken 
into consideration. Man is an end in himself and not a means. 
(1998, 4; emphasis added) 
 
Moreover, while the relational element is an important element in 
African ethics (as evinced in the Shona notion of ukama, which 
emphasises the interrelatedness of humans, the environment, God and 
the ancestors), it also finds expression in the Lakota phrase Mitakuye 
oyasin or the Cree concept of wahkohtowin (‘All is related’; ‘We are all 
related’), both of which refer to the self in relation, the self defined 
relationally (see HORSTHEMKE 2015, 3, 78). If the quest is for a 
uniquely African perspective or contribution, then it cannot stop here.   
Space constraints do not permit a more thorough treatment of 
the question of the priority of rights over duties, or vice versa – which I 
have offered elsewhere (see HORSTHEMKE 2010). I also do not wish 
to engage in depth in the seemingly pointless, ‘chicken-or-egg’-type 
debate of establishing the priority of either the individual or the 
community (see GYEKYE 1998; 317, 320-322). Every statement like “I 
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am because we are”, every argument that seeks to establish the 
dependence of the individual on the community or the fact of communal 
or social relations (for individual human beings are born into existing 
social and cultural structures), can be countered by statements to the 
effect that “we are because I am” and other such arguments that seek to 
establish the dependence of the community on the individuals (for 
where and how could a community exist in the absence of individuals?), 
all of which seem to be equally difficult, if not impossible, to establish 
convincingly, let alone incontrovertibly. It is true, as Bartholomäus Grill 
observes, that: 
Africans grow up in the community, in groups of village 
children, reach maturity within their cohort of peers, share the 
stages of initiation and have learnt as adults to act communally. 
For the environment is harsh, resources are scarce … Scarcity 
gives birth to ubuntu, solidarity and joint action …, a 
fundamental commandment of African ethics which ranks 
communalism above selfishness and cooperation above 
competition. (2003; 361, 362; my translation) 
Nonetheless, Grill cautions against idealising this social system: 
For example, the assertion that Africans have a happier 
childhood is a myth. Certainly, the infant who is carried on his 
mother’s back experiences a sense of well-being and comfort. 
Yet, the tenderness and security of the mother-child dyad ends 
suddenly, as soon as the child learns to walk. The toddler is 
plunged from his nest into the community and begins to move 
with it. No one pays special attention to him anymore, and the 
maternal blanket is now occupied by a younger sibling. At 
mealtimes he frequently misses out and when a famine breaks 
out, he is among the first victims claimed. (2003; 362; my 
translation; of course, Grill’s claims raise the question whether 
they are generally valid and applicable to all parts of Africa - 
and if not, which particular social system he is referring to) 
A disconcerting feature of elevating the community above the individual 
in the discussion of social bonds and relationships is contained in the 
view that that ‘the idea of individual rights … is … bound to be foreign 
to this system’ (GBADEGESIN 1998b, 295). This kind of view permits 
gross violation of human rights, insofar as the individual may be 
sacrificed for the community, social group or common good.  
The virtue of Menkiti’s notion of personhood is that it allows us 
to acknowledge that the existence of the community and communal, 
social relations is essential for the existence not of individuals but of 
individual persons. The problem is that this account of personhood is at 
Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 
Vol. 7.  No. 2.                                                                   May-August, 2018 
P
a
g
e
7
0
 
 
once too wide (in that it includes the living dead) and too narrow (in that 
it excludes human babies, children, the mentally deficient, and non-
human animals – all of whom are arguably moral recipients and subjects 
of a life that can be better or worse for them). 
Moreover, if the belief that the “excessive demonstration of 
grief in the event of the death of a child will make the mother infertile, 
as it will make her reach her menopause prematurely” and the belief that 
“the excessive show of grief … will drive the dead child too ‘far away’ 
for it to reincarnate, and so be reborn” are both “superstitious” 
(GYEKYE 1998: 323), then why should the belief in ancestor moral 
function, agency and intentionality not qualify as superstition? 
Menkiti also fails to pay attention to the fact that the social and 
ritualistic processes of integration and incorporation of individuals as 
mature members of a community are essentially gendered. (On the 
complexities of gender relations and the tensions between individual and 
collective personhood in traditional African societies, see KRATZ 
2000.) Traditional cultures, in Africa as elsewhere, largely perceive the 
world as fundamentally gendered, and rituals of integration and 
incorporation reflect this perception. This raises questions about 
traditions and cultural practices (such as polygamy and ukuhlolwa 
kwezintombi, or ‘virginity testing’ in girls) that arguably involve 
deprecatory treatment and consideration of girls and women. Reference 
might be made here to Pitika Ntuli (2002: 53, 66), on the validity and 
desirability of the amaqhikiza system (a type of mentorship programme 
among older and younger girls “to ensure sexual abstinence” until the 
latter are “ready to take full control of their affairs”) and of ukuhlolwa 
kwezintombi (which “seeks to achieve the goal of purity in the context 
of the spread of HIV/Aids”) in South Africa. One might also refer to 
Mogobe Ramose, on the compatibility of ubuntu and polygamy: “That 
marriage should not of necessity be monogamous is one of the ancient 
practices of ubuntu philosophy” (2002: 329). Given the reality and 
character of (especially South) African polygamy, this declaration is 
tantamount to ‘ubuntu for men’. (See also ASANTE 2003, 68: 
“Relationships that are based on more than one man or more than one 
woman can also be based upon the principles of Afrocentricity.” Taking 
into account what we know about the forms and nature of polygamy on 
the African continent, Asante’s assertion comes across as an 
endorsement of Afro-androcentrism.) As Oyowe has noted, “female-
personhood is generally inferior to male-personhood” in the ways in 
which “social life in traditional African culture is organized” (2014: 57). 
And what about instances where traditional gender roles are 
subverted or ignored? Could African gays and lesbians conceivably 
qualify as full-fledged members of the community? Not according to 
Molefi Kete Asante (2003, 74), who claims that:  
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There is no history of homosexuality being accepted in any 
African society as a 
normal lifestyle. ... In fact, in most African languages there is 
no word for homosexuality. … the historical relationship, the 
biologically natural relationship is between men and women.  
Speaking about Afrocentricity in particular, Asante states (2003, 72, 73),  
Homosexuality and lesbianism are deviations from Afrocentric 
thought because they often make the person evaluate his or her 
own physical needs above the teachings of national 
consciousness. If we take the paradigm of location as a starting 
place, we see that gays and lesbian communities often place 
their sexual preferences and orientations before their 
nationalism. … Our initial oppression is not because we are gay 
or lesbian, but because we are black. … An Afrocentric 
perspective recognizes its existence but homosexuality cannot 
be condoned or accepted as good for the national development 
of a strong people.  
Wiredu seems to agree, and his argument relates even more directly to 
traditional (Akan) recognition as a person:  
… being married with children well raised is part of the 
necessary conditions for personhood in the normative sense. A 
non-marrying, non-procreative person, however normal 
otherwise … can permanently forget any prospect of this type 
of recognition in traditional Akan society. (1998: 316) 
It appears, then, that the account of personhood given by Wiredu and 
Menkiti is too narrow in an additional respect, in that it does not 
accommodate those outside the hetero-normative mainstream. 
Justice, community, and the case of non-human animals 
Taking his cue from Menkiti’s (1984, 171) claim that “the reality of the 
communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life”, 
the consideration that “in African cultures … the dignity of the 
community is more important than the dignity of a mere individual” and 
that “morality is a function of experience and communal rationality”, 
Fainos Mangena maintains that, in the communitarian cultures of sub-
Sahara Africa, “justice does not reside in the individual – it resides in 
the community of which the individual is part”. Here, the “ideas of 
reason, spirit and desire … exist as assets of the community and not [as 
in Platonic terms] as elements that make up an individual” (2012, 8). As 
noted earlier, Menkiti points out that according to the African 
conceptions of person and community, personhood is not the sort of 
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thing one is born with, that it “has to be attained, and is attained in direct 
proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge of 
the various obligations defined by one’s stations” (1984, 176). Since an 
individual “comes to deserve the duties of justice … only through 
possession of a capacity for moral personality, … morality ought to be 
considered as essential to our sense of ourselves as persons”, i.e. “as a 
fundamental part of what it means to be a person” (ibid.). This, in 
essence, is an African articulation of what has become known as 
‘justice-as-reciprocity’ or ‘justice-as-mutuality’ – it is essentially related 
to the power of ‘persons’. 
As it stands, the conception of justice proposed here serves to 
exclude not only animals but also those humans deficient in the 
purportedly relevant capacities, who are not (yet) ‘persons’.  
The implications of Menkiti’s view are clear: not only can non-human 
animals not be considered persons, but human zygotes, foetuses, babies 
and even children also fail to qualify, as do the mentally incapacitated. 
In other words, all those who cannot and will never be able to 
participate in communal life, to contribute to the good – to reciprocate, 
as it were. This conception of justice is deficient in important respects in 
that it cannot accommodate these individuals.  
A conception of justice as ‘subject-centred’, on the other hand, 
is able to account for the extension of considerations of justice, or the 
ascription of rights, beyond the class of persons in Menkiti’s sense. 
According to subject-centred conceptions of justice, basic moral 
considerations governing justice and rights are grounded not in an 
individual’s capacity to reciprocate, to participate in communal life or to 
contribute to the common good (although this may certainly be an 
important consideration at a secondary or non-basic level) but rather in 
other features of the individual herself, for example her needs and 
welfare interests. When Tutu refers to “other issues of justice”, he takes 
these to apply not only to human beings but also to “the world’s other 
sentient creatures” (2013, xv). “Even when faced with human problems” 
that “fight for our attention in what sometimes seems an already overfull 
moral agenda”, we should not overlook “instances of injustice”, i.e. “the 
abuse and cruelty we inflict on other animals” (ibid.). 
A survey of the various African views and considerations 
regarding non-human animals shows that tendencies vary (very broadly) 
from (1) more or less outspoken human-centredness and more or less 
qualified endorsement of human moral superiority via (2) lip service to 
environmental awareness and animal-friendliness to (3) outright 
rejection of moral anthropocentrism and explicit pro-animal attitudes 
(see HORSTHEMKE 2015). It is the middle group that often constitutes 
the greatest challenge to the critical reviewer, in terms of having to 
pinpoint not only the deficiencies of the respective views but also the 
reasons why an environmentally friendly view may not necessarily 
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(indeed, often does not) incorporate any direct concern for individual 
non-human animals. For one thing, the critical reviewer may not want to 
belittle or discourage the ethical progress and advancements, however 
small and tentative, that have been made. For another, suggesting a 
radicalization in environmental and pro-animal thought and practice 
may seem to threaten or at least minimize the distinctly African 
contribution to the ethical debates in question. This is arguably where a 
sustained focus on the last group becomes all-important. It is crucial to 
determine what values and other conceptual and practical resources exist 
in African awareness not merely to ameliorate but to bring about 
substantial changes in the conditions under which the many billions of 
animals live (and die) on the continent. In other words, I share the 
concerns expressed by many animal rights advocates that a focus on 
‘animal welfare’ is likely to be counterproductive, in that it serves to 
legitimate current abusive practices, is not committed to 
acknowledgement of the inherent value – let alone moral rights – of 
animals and secures fairly negligible benefits for the latter. 
For the purposes of this article, I will focus on the first group of 
writers and thinkers. Their theoretical positions range from open 
endorsement of anthropocentric ethics via indifference to hostility, with 
frequent cautions about the dangers of allocating any sort of moral 
space, let alone rights, to non-humans. Thus, after asserting that the 
various rights implied by duties of justice (characteristically owed to 
persons) and that “the possessor of the rights in question cannot be other 
than a person” (1984, 177), Menkiti states that this interpretation rules 
out “some dangerous tendencies currently fashionable in some 
philosophical circles of ascribing rights to animals” (ibid.). “The 
danger”, as he sees it, 
 
is that such an extension of moral language to the domain of 
animals is bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of 
our conception of what it means to be a person. The practical 
consequences are also something for us to worry about. For if 
there is legitimacy in ascribing rights to animals then human 
beings could become compelled to share resources with them 
[…, such as] equally deserving cats and dogs. Minority persons 
might then find themselves the victims of a peculiar philosophy 
in which the constitutive elements in the definition of human 
personhood have become blurred through unwarranted 
extensions to non-human entities. (Ibid.) 
 
Reginald Oduor, too, struggles to make any sense of the notion of 
animal rights: 
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With regard to the possible relationship between struggles 
against slavery and against the oppression of women on the one 
hand and animal rights on the other, I personally do not see one. 
This is due to the fact that the women and the former slaves 
consciously participated in the struggles for their liberation. On 
the other hand, the animals cannot be properly said to 
participate in the struggle for their rights; instead, humans have 
taken it upon themselves to act on behalf of the animals. This is 
not to imply that humans have a right to mistreat animals: I 
think that the fact that human beings are rational obligates them 
to be responsible in their treatment of all sentient beings. (2012, 
9) 
 
Apart from the fact that ‘responsibility’ remains wide open to 
interpretation, it is not difficult to see that, for Oduor, any such 
obligation “to be responsible in their treatment of all sentient beings” is 
not a directly owed to animals. It flows directly from the fact of our 
(human) rationality. Thaddeus Metz (2014) furnishes a telling response 
to arguments like those advanced by Menkiti and Oduor: to extend 
considerations of morality, justice, rights etc. only to (a community or 
communities of) ‘persons’ is unwarrantedly parochial.  
The Chewa proverb Kalikhokha nikanyama; tuli tuwili 
nituwanthu (“What is alone is a brute animal; whatever or whoever has 
a partner/neighbour is a human being”; see KAPHAGAWANI 2004; 
337) indicates a profound ignorance of the nature, character and abilities 
of social animals. A similar misconception underlies the claim that what 
“clearly demarcates humanity from animality” is human possession not 
only of intelligence but also of free will (KAPHAGAWANI 2004; 339; 
KAGAME 1989; 36). Alexis Kagame concedes that humans share with 
other animate beings “the vital principle of animality” but adds that they 
differ from them because they are “animated by a second vital principle 
which is immortal and in which are anchored the intelligent operations 
proper to man”, such as free will (1989; 35). Intelligence is held to be 
demonstrated in the essentially human ability to reflect and meditate on 
the data of their senses, to “compare the facts of knowledge’ human 
beings have acquired, and ‘to invent something new by combining 
previously acquired knowledge” (1989; 36). It may be tempting to argue 
with Wiredu (and with Menkiti) that the intellectual attributes singled 
out by Kagame – intelligence and free will – are not universal features 
of the human condition: some people have them, others do not. 
Moreover, a person may exhibit them in one context or sphere of 
conduct but not in another (WIREDU 1996, 130). Or one might argue, 
with Tutu, that if “it is true that we are the most exalted species in 
creation, it is equally true that we can be the most debased and sinful” 
(2013, xv). More to the point, however, just like it is an error to 
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disregard the evolutionary kinship between humans and other animals, it 
is a mistake to deny that intellectual and moral dispositions exist in 
some form or other – however rudimentary – in other-than-human 
animals, too. That cognitive and conative capacities exist in varying 
degrees also in other species is now widely accepted by a wide range of 
researchers in both the natural and the social sciences. 
A further distinguishing characteristic identified by Kagame is 
that humans, but not animals, have a good or bad roho (the Kiswahili 
word for ‘heart’), i.e. the propensity to act in a morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy manner (see also KAPHAGAWANI 2000; 76, 77). Here, 
“the heart” refers to personality: “in the heart lies the personality of man 
… It is by which this man is himself and not another” (KAGAME 1989, 
36). Personality is what characterizes human beings; it is also “one of 
the criteria for distinguishing one person from another” 
(KAPHAGAWANI 2004, 339). One might point out that this just shifts 
the problem - for now we want to know what exactly constitutes 
‘personality’. Perhaps we might associate personality with moral 
personality, along the lines already suggested by Menkiti. But why does 
this involve a misconception? To repeat, intelligence and personality 
(even moral personality and agency) are not matters of ‘all-or-nothing’. 
They are possessed in varying degrees by both human beings and 
animals. Mentally impaired humans and children have these abilities to 
comparatively lesser degrees than so-called ‘normal’ adult human 
beings, and some non-human animals have these abilities to 
comparatively higher degrees than both certain human beings and 
certain other animals. 
Considering the brutal and dehumanizing ravages of 
colonialism, racism and apartheid that Africans have historically been 
subjected to, it does not seem to be wholly off the mark to invite people 
in sub-Sahara Africa, especially, to reflect on a further, deeply-
entrenched historical process of discrimination, oppression and 
exploitation, namely that of species apartheid. However, adoption of a 
more enlightened stance vis-à-vis the non-human world and animals in 
particular would almost certainly involve giving up the moral 
anthropocentrism that characterizes many attitudes and practices on the 
African continent. This, I hasten to add, need not entail surrendering 
what is arguably at the core of sub-Saharan morality – the emphasis on 
relationality. “I am because we are” could quite plausibly be interpreted 
as including not only infants, children, and people with cognitive and 
physical disabilities, but also as transcending the species barrier. It is in 
the main a matter of giving new substance to who counts as ‘we’. 
Indeed, a growing number of African scholars are aware that 
anthropocentrism shares many relevant features with ethnocentrism, and 
that speciesism is relevantly like racism. The question is whether those 
who (after their own liberation) continue to brutalize, exploit and 
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oppress other creatures, simply because they can, do not thereby 
contribute to their own ongoing dehumanization. Perhaps the minimal 
insight one could reasonably expect from African humanism is that true 
human liberation also consists in the act of human beings freeing 
themselves from the role of subjugators, from the oppressive and 
exploitative relationship they have with the rest of animate nature, and 
from instrumentalization and objectification of the non-human at the 
expense of the latter’s lives, freedom, and well-being. 
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